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JUDICIAL DELIMITATION OF THE
FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOMS
CHESTER- JAmS.S ANTiAu*

"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a
redress of grievances."
So reads the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States. Although its language seems clear in saying that legislatures
shall pass no law prohibiting the free exercise of religion or adbridging
the other freedoms,' the jurists charged with the task of delimiting
liberty have condoned many laws restrictive of expression. When the
judiciary has found unsavory particular activities it has avoided Constitutional implications by asserting that the expressions were not really
exercises of free speech, press or religion. The United States Supreme
Court of 1890 said of a religious group conscientionsly believing in
polygamy: "To call their advocacy a tenet of religion is to offend the
common sense of mankind." 2 Mr. Justice McKenna for the United
States Supreme Court of 1915 denied First Amendment safeguards to
the films on the pretext that the exhibition of moving pictures was not
embraced within either freedom of speech or press. This was justified,
he felt, by "the judicial sense supporting the common sense of the
country.. .,, Of a religious group believing in propagandizing their
faith in an unusual way, Chief Justice Hughes said in 1941: "The argument as to freedom of worship is also beside the point. No interference
with religious worship or the practice of religion in any proper sense
J.D., Detroit College of Law;
Professor of Law, Detroit College of Law; Member of Michigan Bar; Member of the State Bar of Michigan Committee on Administrative Agencies, and
of the Committee on Conflict of Laws of the Association of American Law
Schools.
I "No one who reads with care the text of the First Amendment can fail to
to be startled by its absolutness. The phrase, 'Congress shall make no law. ..'
is unqualified. It admits of no exceptions. To say that no laws of a given
type shall be made means that no laws of that type shall, under any circum*B.S., M.S., Detroit Institute of Technology;

stances be made." Meiklejohn, "Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government," (1948) 18.
2 Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 341 (1890).
3 Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 244 (1915).
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is shown."'4 Other Supreme Court justices have resorted to similar
tactics, 5 and the example has not been lost on the lower federal and
state courts.6 The possibilities of this semantic negation are considerable and ominous. Witness, for example, the government's assertion
in the Trinity Church case that broadcast speech is not "speech" within
the meaning of the First Amendment.7
Similarly, jurists have upheld abridgments of expression on the
rationale that the law was not a "real" abridgment of freedom. Mr.
Justice Reed, in Kovacs v. Cooper, ruled that "the question is whether
or not there is a real abridgment of the rights of free speech.",, Of
course, the Constitution does not say that legislatures are to avoid only
laws "really" abridging freedom. The sophistry of evasion is ample
to the predilections of the bench.
Another favorite technique of the judge in facile circumvention of
the Constitutional language is found in an amazing insight into the
contrary intent of the Founding Fathers. In 1799 James Iredell, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, suggested that there must have
been an intended difference between the absolute prohibition upon laws
establishing religion and the "lesser" restriction upon laws abridging
freedom of religion, speech, press or assembly. At the circuit he stated:
"When, as to one object, they entirely prohibit any act whatever, and
as to another object, only limit the exercise of the power, they must,
in reason, be supposed to mean different things. I presume, therefore,
that Congress may make a law respecting the press, provided the law
be such as not to abridge its freedom." 9 Iredell's ingenious theory is
without any historical evidence to support it, and it is utterly unserviceable as a statement of test or principle. The framers of the First
v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 578 (1941).
5As Justice Murphy removed a minister's activity from the area of Constitutional protection, he said he could not "conceive that cursing a public officer
is the exercise of religion in any sense of the term." Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942). Chief Justice Stone remarked that procuring
"money by making knowingly false statements about one's religious experience" was not religious liberty at all. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78,
88-9 (1944).
6 "No question of religious liberty, in any true sense, is here involved," stated
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in 1942 in denying a claim to
exemption of a minister from war service. Rase v. United States, 129 F. 2d
204. "The defendant's individual ideas, whether 'conscientious,' 'religious,' or
'scientific,' do not appear to be more than opinions. They are not shown to
involve any question of religious liberty." State v. Drew, 192 A. 629, 89 N.H.
54, (1937). Refering to the United States Supreme Court, a commentator
has said: ". . .the Court did not follow the lead of some state tribunals

4 Cox

which, in questioning the validity of the religious scruple against saluting,
have opened the way to facile rejection of religious claims through simple
denial that any religious scruple is 'in reality' involved."

7

Comment, The

Compulsory Flag Salute in the Supreme Court, 9 I.J.A.Bull. 1, 12 (1940).
Trinity Methodist Church South v. Fed. Radio Comm., 62 F. 2d 850 at pp. 47-9

of the Government's brief.
8336 U.S. 77, 85 (1949).
9The trial of the Northhampton Insurgents, Wharton's State Trials (1849) 478.
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Amendment could never have intended, according to the United States
Supreme Court of 1890, that it "could be invoked as a protection
against legislations for the punishment of acts inimical to the peace,
good order and morals of society."' 0 And only recently a state court
asserted: "The constitutional guaranty of religious freedom was not
intended to prohibit legislation with respect to the general welfare."
Afer a while, the judiciary can defend its constitutional "interpretation" by case precedent permitting abridgments of freedom, and the
Constitutional language is buried. As Meiklejohn has aptly remarked:
"The Court has interpreted the dictum that Congress shall not abridge
the freedom of speech by defining the conditions under which such
abridging is allowable."' 2 It is necessary, therefore, to examine the
tests and principles utilized by the American judiciary in defining the
conditions under which the First Amendment freedoms may be
abridged.
The Objective Tests; (1) Freedom from Previous Restraint
Occasionally objective tests are utilized or suggested in the delimitation of liberty. Blackstone endorsed a test having objectivity in a
temporal determinant. He defined freedom by exemption only from
previous restraint, and to him there was no prohibition upon subsequent
"censure for criminal matter."' 3 In 1797 Chief Justice McKean of
Pennsylvania ruled: "The liberty of the press ... consists in laying no
previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from censure
for criminal matter when published. Every freeman has an undoubted
right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this
is to destroy the freedom the press; but if he publishes what is improper, mischeivous, or illegal, he must take fhe consequences of his
temerity."' 4 The Blackstonian notion of freedom influenced American
jurists considerably and it survived into this century, with even the
Justice Holmes of 1907 espousing it.15
This test is a compound of error and impracticality. To deprive
"criminal" matter of protection is obviously to beg the question. Yet
courts still repeat this amazing idea. "The religious doctrine or belief
of a person," says the Indiana court, "cannot be recognized or accepted
as a justification or excuse for his committing an act which is a criminal
under the law of the land.""' The thing to be decided is whether a
statute labelling the exercise of freedom a "crime" because it is distasteful to the temporal majority survives the test of the Constitution.
10 Davis v. Beason, 133, U.S. 333, 342 (1890).

"1Sadlock v. Board of Education, 58 A. 2d 218, 222, N.J. (1948).
12Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government (1948) 29.
13 4 B1.Comm. 150.
4The trial of William Cobbett, Wharton's" State Trials (1849) 323-4.
15 Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
16 State v. Chenoweth, 71 N.E. 197, 199, 163 Ind. 94 (1904).
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Utterly unwise is the suggestion that nothing may be suppressed
before publication and anything punished after publication, and thinking scholars have recognized this since the eighteenth century. In 1799
the Virginia House of Delegates Committee on Resolutions regarding
the Alien and Sedition laws reported, in the language of James Madison: "The freedom of the press under the common law, is, in the defences of the Sedition Act, made to consist in an exemption from all
previous restraint on pronted publications by persons authorized to
inspect and prohibit them. It appears to the Committee that this idea
of the freedom of the press can never be admitted to be the American
idea of it; since a law inflicting penalties on printed publications would
have a similar effect with a law authorizing a previous restraint on
them. It would seem a mockery to say that no laws should be passed
for punishing them in case they should be made ... This security of
the freedom of the press requires that it should be exempt -not only
from previous restraint by the Executive, as in Great Britain, but
from legislative restraint also; and this exemption, to be effectual, must
be an exemption not only from the previous inspection of licensers,
but from the subsequent penalty of laws. ' 17 In 1868 Cooley refreshed
this idea when he wrote: ". . . the mere exemption from previous restraint cannot be all that is secured by the constitutional provisions, inasmuch as of words to be uttered orally there can be no previous censorship, and the liberty of the press might be rendered a mockery and
a delusion, and the phrase itself a byword if, while every man was at
liberty to publish what he pleased, the public authorities might neverthe less punish him for harmless publications."18 More recently Dean
Pound has re-emphasized: ". . . if liability for any sort of publication
which the legislature chooses to penalize may be imposed upon the
publisher after the act, the result may easily be to effectually prevent
indirectly and so establish a censorship and evade the guarantee."' 9
It must be borne in mind that Blackstone was interpreting an immature common law and not the Constitution of the United States.
Paterson claims that "Blackstone's statement did not accord with American ideas at the time of the adoption of the First Amendment," 20 and
another capable scholar asserts that "we cannot possibly accept this
rule as the essence of the freedom for which our forefathers fought
so bitterly. It would be an insult to their intelligence and contrary to
17 Writings of James Madison (Hunt ed.) VI, 386-7.
IsConstitutional Limitations (1st ed., 1868) 421.
19 Equitable Relief against Defamation and Injuries to Personality, 29 Harv.L.
Rev. 640, 651 (1916). "The actual prevention of communication, therefore,
would seem to depend not so much upon whether the statutory scheme imposes a prior restraint, or subsequent punishment, as upon the efficiency with
which that scheme, whatever its nature, is enforced." Note, Prior Restraints
-A Test of Invalidity in Free Speech Cases, 49 Col.L.Rev. 1001, 1003 (1949).
20 Free Speech and a Free Press (1939) 101.

1950]

JUDICIAL DELIMITATION OF FREEDOMS

fact. It assumes that the Revolution added nothing at all to our liberty,
and we were mildly content to confirm the disappearance of the censor
-who had in fact disappeared in England in 1694 and in the Colonies
about 1720 ... It is no compliment to the American people to say they
got so excited over incorporating free press guaranties in their constitutions just to be certain to keep out a censor already dead for nearly
21
a hundred years.1
Blackstone's language will likely continue to be used in invalidating
some. of the previous restraints upon freedom. 22 There are, however,
some previous restraints, such as prohibition in time of war upon the
publication of sailing dates of troopships, which are proper under any
intelligent weighing of societal interests. It is in the blithe disregard
of opposed societal interests that a temporal determinant is a rule without reason and perforce useless in delimiting liberty. "Whatever the
value of the prior restraints doctrine in the past, it has outlived its
usefulness." 23
The Objective Tests (2) The "Commercial Criterion"
Communications have been denied First Amendment safeguards
because they were "commercial." In 1915 the denial to the films of
free speech and press protection was defended by Mr. Justice McKenna
for the United States Supreme Court on the ground that "the exhibition of moving pictures is a business, pure and simple, originated and
conducted for profit." 24 The Supreme Court said in 1939: "We are
not to be taken as holding that commercial soliciting and canvassing
may not be subjected to such regulations as the ordinance requires." 25
Then, in 1942, a unanimous Court held that "purely commercial advertising" was not entitled to the protection of the First Amendment. The
case, Valentine v. Chrestensen,26 decided that a city could ban the distribution of a handbill having one one side an advertisement for an
exhibition of a submarine and on the other side a protest against the
authorities' refusal of warfage facilities at a city pier for the display.
Mr. Justice Roberts stated: "This court has unequivocally held that
the streets are proper places for exercise of the freedom of communicating information and disseminating opinion and that, though the
states municipalities may appropriately regulate the privilege in the
public interest, they may not unduly burden or proscribe its employment in these public thoroughfares. We are equally clear that the
Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects pureWhipple, Our Ancient Liberties (1927) 93.
e.g. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1911).
23 Note, Prior Restraint-A Test of Invalidity in Free Speech Cases? 49 Col.L.
Rev. 1001, 1006 (1949).
24 Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 244 (1915).
25 Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 165 (1939).
26 316 U.S. 52 (1942). Semble: People v. Uffindell, 202 P. 2d 874, Calif. (1949).
21

22
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ly commercial advertising. Whether, and to what extent, one may pursue a gainful occupation in the streets, to what extent such activety
shall be adjudged a derogation of the public right of user, are matters
for legislative judgment." 27 Mr. Justice Reed's ill-fated opinion in the
first Jones v. Opelika case also indicated that the "commercialism" of
the activity deprived it of First Amendment protection. ". . it is
because we view these sales as partaking more of commercial than
religious or educational transactions," he said, "that we find the ordinances, as here presented, valid."' Justice Reed would even have
gone beyond the commercial criterion in denying constitutional safeguards, since to him it was "enough that money is earned by the sale
of articles." This, as he readily admitted "does not require a finding
29
that the licensed acts are purely commercial."
However, the same Justice has recently indicated for the Court
that commercial magazines are not to be denied all constitutional free
press protection. In the Winters case, which involved not the use of the
streets but a complete ban on publications devoted to crime and bloodshed, Mr. Justice Reed stated: "We do not accede to appelle's suggestion that the constitutional protection for a free press applies only to
the exposition of ideas. The line between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the protection of that basic right. Everyone
is familiar with instances of propaganda through fiction. What is
one man's amusement, teaches another's doctrine. Though we can
see nothing of any possible value to society in these magazines, they
are as much entitled to the protection of free speech as the best of
literature." 30 This is a judicial attitude far different from that of the
Chrestensen case. It should effectively dissipate the value of state court
holdingsal that officials can ban the sale and distribution of commercial
magazines, not immoral.
In the Chrestensen case the municipal authorities contended that
they could prohibit the handbills if they were "primarily" commercial,
but the Court of Appeals refused to recognize the "commercial" test,82
and the Supreme Court seemingly denied the propriety of a "primarily"
commercial standard when it indicated its preference for the "purely
commercial" test. One is entitled to question the Court's description of
27316
28316

29316

U.S. 52, 54.

U.S. 584, 598 (1942). Judgment vacated, 319 U.S. (1943).
U.S. 584, 596. State courts have denied claims of freedom when they could

label the activity "commercial" or "profitable." "A person should not be allowed to practice the tenets ... of any church as a shield to cover a business undertaking." People v. Cole, 113 N.E. 790, 794, 219 N.Y. 98 (1916).
Smith v. People, 117 P. 2d 612, 615, Colo. (1911) ; Dill v. Hamilton, 291 N.W.

62, 65, 137 Neb. 723 (1940).

30 Winters v. People of State of New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948).

31 e.g. Ex parte Mares, 171 P. 2d 762 (Dist.Ct. of App., 1st Dist., Calif., 1946).
122 F. 2d 511, 515 (CA, 2d, 1941).
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the handbill involved in the case as "purely" commercial. Other handbills have been held not to be "purely commercial" even though they
solicited attendance at meetings at which admission was charged, which
3
fee was mentioned in the handbills.
What justifies a denial of constitutional protection of free press to
"purely commercial" matter? Is it because of its supposedly slight social
value in the search for truth or in aid of the democratic process? Apparently the Court is not positing its refusal on such a basis, as witness
the words of the Court in the Winters case. Other courts have, however, felt that commercial advertising contributes little to the functioning of democratic institutions and for that reason should be subject to
34
legislative prohibition unrestrained by constitutional free press clauses.
Some courts have suggested such a distinction is sound inasmuch as
commercial matter has available many other channels of distribution
than the public streets, whereas the thoroughfare may be the only
effective avenue of communication to purveyors of political or religious
ideas.35 This attempted differentiation loses sight of the other channels
available to, for instance, religious propagandists, such as the pulpit,
the radio, the religious press, etc. Assuredly the commercial handbill
has fewer channels of distribution that the detective thriller afforded
freedom of the press protection in the Winters case. Lastly, it has
been suggested that there is a greater littering of the streets from the
distribution of commercian handbills since it is assumed that recipients
retain them less readily than political, religious or economic tracts.38
38
7
Judge Clark denies this assumption, and it is questionable.
Young v. People, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); People v. Loring and Green, unreported decision of Magistrate's Court, New York City (1933).
34 People v. LaRollo, 24 N.Y.S. 2d 350, 354 (1940); Chrestensen v. Valentine,
122 F. 2d 511, 517 (CA 2d, 1941), Frank, J., dissenting opinion.
35 "To prevent peddling of business handbills on the street still leaves the businessman at liberty to use other modes of advertising, as in newspapers, for
instance." Chrestensen v. Valentine, 122 F. 2d 511, 524 (CA 2d, 1941), Frank.,
J., dissenting opinion. "There is a real basis for distinction between the exercise of such constitutional rights when in connection with ordinary business
activities and in the exercise of those same rights when in relation to public
expression of opinion upon political, religious, social and economic questions
• . .As far as general expressions of opinion are concerned, public places
frequently afford the only forum where free speech may be exercised. Under
such circumstances, prohibition of the use of the streets for this purpose at
once constitutes an abridgment of the right of free speech and a violation
of the constitutional guaranty. On the other hand, prohibition of the use
of public places for purposes of commercial advertising... may not so readily
be said to abridge constitutional rights in this respect. Other channels of
expression of equal value may still be left open to the commercial advertiser"
Pittsford v. City of Los Angeles, 122 P. 2d 535, 538 (Dist.Ct. of App., 2d Dist.,
Calif., 1942).
36 Coughlin v. Sullivan, 100 N.J.L. 42, 126 A. 177 (1924).
37 Valentine v. Chrestensen, 122 F. 2d 511, 513 fn. 1 (CA 2d, 1941).
38 "Nor is it true that commercial advertising in the form of a dodger or handbill is more likely to be thrown in the street and result in its being littered
than handbills or dodgers containing political or economim propaganda." Milwaukee v. Kassen, 203 Wisc. 383, 234 N.W. 352 (1931).
33
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Mr. Justice Roberts' opinion in the Chrestensen case contributes little
to an understanding of the Court's reason for a "commercial' rule. He
remarked: "It is time enough for the present purpose that the stipulated facts justify the conclusion that the affixing of the protest against
official conduct to the advertising circular was with the intent, and
for the purpose, of evading the prohibition of the ordinance." 3 9 If
evasionary intent and diabolical purpose must be explored in every
hybrid handbill case, such subjectivity would strip the "test" of any
objective value. Justice Robert's admission that "the streets are proper
places for the exercise of freedom of communicating information" inevitably raises the question: information about what? Seemingly not
about weapons of national defense. Is only information on a topic considered important by the Court worthy of exposure to the market place?
And, is there anything more commercial in Chrestensen's activity than
in the advancement of its own commercial interests by union picketing,
40
accorded full constitutional protection since the Thornhill decision.
Is a "commercial" test susceptible of intelligent application by the
judiciary without endangering the vitality of our fundamental freedoms? Mr. Justice Douglas was eminently right in his forecast that
"situations will arise where it will be difficult to determine whether a
particular activity is religious or purely commercial." 41 A New York
court admits: "The line between commercial and non-commercial advertising may at times be a most tenuous one,'

42

and the Court of

Appeals in the Chrestensen case indicated the difficulty, if not impossibility, of applying such a test.4 3 Commentators, like the courts, have
attested to the impracticability of the test.

4

And, one need only recall

Mr. Justice Reed's labelling, for the Court in the first Opelika case,45
the distribution of religious literature for a nominal fee as "commercial" to appreciate the dangers to freedom inherent in such a test. 45

Furthermore, state court cases indicate all too clearly a readiness to
denominate as "commercial" and "advertising" literature essentially of
47
a religious, political or economic nature.
39316
U.S. 52, 55 (1942).
40
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
41
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 110 (1943).
42People v. LaRollo, 24 N.Y.S. 2d 350, 354 (1940).
43122 F. 2d 511, 515 (CA 2d, 1941).
4 "Difficulties are likely to arise, of course, in determining what is and what
is not commercial." Fraenkel, Our Civil Liberties (1944) 103. "It will be
difficult to define non-commercial and commercial activities." Lindsay, The
Handbill Ordinances, 39 Mich..L.Rev. 561, 595 (1941).
45 Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 598 (1942).
46 Compare In re Rogers, 47 F.Supp. 265 (DC, N.D.Tex., 1942) denying a Christian Science reader a ministerial classification because he could show no earnings.
- See Almassi v. Newark, 8 N.J.Misc. 420, 150 A. 217 (1930), where an announcement of a political rally was held to be "advertising" matter; Commonwealth v. Kimball, 299 Mass. 343, 13 N.E. 2d 18 (1938), where a pamphlet ad-
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Of questionable constitutionality and debatable wisdom' s in the
paradox that today permits the complete prohibition of a handbill advertising a submarine display, while a newspaper carring a a similar
advertisement is immune to ban. The query has been posed: "How
much news must be inserted to make a newspaper ?"49 It is a fitting
question, and any rule making constitutional safeguards hinge upon the
insertion of something the Court considers "news" or "information"
deserves only condemnation.
The application of a "Commercial" test is not only difficult but
extremely dangerous to the cause of freedom. There are inadequate
societal justifications for the repression of these communications, and
the stimulation of commerce can hardly be gravely objectionable in a
free enterprise economy. Mr. Justice Rutledge well said: "The idea
is not sound therefore that the First Amendment's safeguards are
wholly inapplicable to business or economic activity and it does not resolve where the line shall be drawn in a particular case merely to urge
... that an organization for which the rights of free speech and free
assembly are claimed is one 'engaged in business activities,' or that
the individual who leads it in exercising those rights receives compen' °
sation for doing so."
5 Courts have condemned ordinances and statutes

banning the dissemination of commercial matter, as violative of constitutional free speech and press clauses. 5' There is today good indication
that at least one of the aforementioned media will not much longer be
totally denied the protection of the First Amendment because of its
"commercialism." 52 Obviously publishers for profit can contribute ideas
useful in man's search for truth and in the successful functioning of
democratic institutions. The fundamental freedom to listen and read
cannot be abridged because someone profits from the propagation of
the idea.53 The "commercial" test should be abandoned forthwith.
vocating unionization and announcing a free performance of a labor play
was ruled an "advertisement." See further: Note, Conflicting Decisions on
Commercial Character of Union Leaflets, 6 Int'l. Jurid. Ass'n. Bull. 102 (1938).
48 "A handbill ordinance may be set aside if it is discriminatory on its face or
in its operation. The authority for this judicial action is found in the Equal
Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and of the state constitutions." Lindsay, supra note 141, at 575. See also Ex parte Johns, 129 Tex.Cr.
587, 88 S.W. 2d 709 (1935) ; and Note, 26 Minn.L.Rev. 553, 554 (1942).
49 Note, 5 U. of Chi.L.Rev. 675, 676 (1938).
50°Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 (1945).
51Robert v. City of Norfolk, 188 Va. 413, 49 S.E. 2d 697 (1948); People v.
Osborne, 17 Cal.App. 2d Supp. 771, 59 P. 2d 1083 (1936) ; Ex parte Pierce, 127
Tex.Cr. 35, 75 S.W. 2d 264 (1934).; Walters v. Valentine, 172 Misc. 264, 12
N.Y.S. 2d 612 (1939), holding invalid a prohibition of advertising by sandwich men, denying the state's argued distinction between commercial and
non-commercial matter. See also McKay Jewelers v. Bowron, 19 Cal. 2d 595,
122 P. 2d 543 (1942).
52 "Moving pictures, like newspapers and radio, are included in the press whose
freedom is guaranteed by the First Amendment." United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948).
53 "The holding that 'commercial advertising' (presumably because of the profit
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The Constitutional Criteria;Subjective Tests
In 1804, after it was argued to the New York court by Alexander
Hamilton, Chancellor Kent adopted "as perfectly correct, the comprehensive and accurate definition of one of the counsel at the bar, that
the liberty of the press consists in the right to publish, with impunity,
truth, with good motives and for justifiable ends, whether it respects
government, magistracy, or individuals.

' 54

Later Kent wrote in his

Commentaries; "It has become a constitutional principle in this country,
that every citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments
on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right.' 55 Shortly
thereafter, his close friend, Joseph Story, wrote of the First Amendment: "It is plain, then, that the language of this amendment imports
no more, than that every man shall have a right to speak, write, and
print his opinions upon any subject whatsoever, without any prior
restraint, so always, that he does not injure any other person in his
rights, person, property, or reputation; and so always, that he does not
thereby distrub the public peace, or attempt to subvert the government.

It is neither more nor less, that an expansion of the great doctrine, recently brought into operation in the law of libel, that every man shall
be at liberty to publish what is true, with good motives, and for
justifiable ends."56 Although the Hamilton-Kent-Story concept of
"good motives tnd justifiable ends" has not been much honored in the
delimitation of liberty, 57 courts have frequently condoned punishment

motive of the advertiser) is wholly outside the protection of the First Amendment could in the long run destroy most newspapers and periodicals of general
circulation, by exposing the advertising on which they depend to discriminatory taxation or even outright prohibition. A more fundamental reason why
the proposition cannot be maintained is that these freedoms are the right of
the listener as well as of the speaker, of the reader as well as of the publisher;
and indeed that is the reason why they are protcted. The Court should have
deferred consideration of the nature of the literature until it struck a balance
under the clear and present danger rule, and even then it would be difficult
to obtain support for the view that commercial advertising is wholly without
social value." Green, The Supreme Court, the Bill of Rights and the States,
97 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 608, 626 (1949). The wisdom of the "commercial" test
is also questioned in Note, 5 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 675, 676 (1939);; and see
Note, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 487 (1940). For a comment favoring the test, see
Resnik, Freedom of Speech and Commercial Solicitation, 30 Calif. L. Rev.
487 (1942).
People v. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cases (N.Y., 1804) 337, 393.
55 2 Kent's Comm.. (1st ed., 1826) 14.
563 Story's Comm. on Const. (1st ed., 1833) 732-3.
5" The phrase persists as part of state constitutional and statutory provisions to
the effect that libel can be cussessfully defended if the truth was published for
good motives and for justifiable ends. Typical is the Michigan Constitution of
1908 (Art. II, sec. 18) : "In all prosecutions for libels the truth may be given
in evidence to the jury; and, if it shall appear to the jury that the matter
charged as libelous is true and was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the accused shall be acquitted." Consequently, the "test finds
occasional application in libel suits. Kennedy v. Item Co., 34 So. 2d 886, 889,
La. (1948). Beyond this it has no contemporary significance.
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for expression when they considered it an "abuse" of freedom, 5s primarily because all but five of the state constitutions, in protecting freedom of expression, provide for responsibility for its "abuse."' 5 9
Similarly, it has been frequently said that the Constitution guarantees the liberty of the press "but not its licentiousness."6 0 The very
5s "Defendant being guilty of an abuse of freedom of speech, his conviction and
punishment do not constitute an abridgment of his constitutional guaranties." City of Chicago v. Tarminiello, 79 N.E. 2d 39, 45, Ill. (1948); "The
right of free speech is not absolute . . .Its abuse may be punished." Montgomery Ward v. United Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Employees,
79 N.E. 2d 46, 50, Ill. (1948) ; "These constitutional provisions preserve the
right to speak and to publish without previously submitting for official approval the matter to be spoken or published, but do not grant immunity to
those who abuse this privilege. . ." State v. Holm, 139 Minn. 267, 166 N.W.
181, 183 (1918) ; "While his right of free speech is protected, his abuse of it
must be punished." Ex parte Barry, 85 Calif. 603, 607-8, 25 P. 256 (1890);
"The liberty of the press is one thing. The 'abuse of that liberty' is quite
another. The former is guaranteed by the constitution. The latter interdicted.
If the liberty of the press is abused, the offender may be held responsible
therefor." People v. Stapleton, 18 Colo. 567, 586, 33 Pac. 167 (1893); "The
constitutional protection shields no one from responsibility for abuse of this
right." State v. Van Wye, 136 Mo. 227, 234, (1896); "The liberty of the
press means that any one can publish anything he pleases, but he is liable for
the abuse of that liberty." State ex rel. Crow v. Shepherd, 177 Mo. 205, 253,
(1903) ; "The liberty of the press is one thing; the abuse of that liberty is
quite another." State v. Faulds, 17 Mont. 140, 145, (1895) ; "While the right
to publish is thus sanctioned and secured, the abuse of that right is excepted
from the protection of the Constitution." People v. Moat, 171 N.Y. 423, 431,
64 N.E. 175 (1902) ; "Individuals are free to talk, and the press is at liberty
to publish, but they are answerable for the abuse of this privilege." Stuart
v. Press Pub. Co., 82 N.Y.S. 401, 408 (1903) ; "The language used was a clear
abuse of the inestimable privilege of free speech. . ." Comm. v. Lazar, 157 A.
701, 703, Pa. (1931); "The constitutional guaranty itself qualifies the immunity
by a plain indication that while the right is given, the abuse of that right is
not to be tolerated. . ." State v. Gibson, 189 Iowa 1212, 1217, (1920). Chief
Justice Hughes once stated: "The right (of free speech) is not an absolute
one and the state . . may punish the abuse of this freedom." Stromberg v.
California, 283 U.S. 359, 368 (1931). And, in Near v. Minnesota, he said:
"Liberty of speech, and of the press, is also not an absolute right, and the
state may punish its abuse." 283 U.S. 697, 708 (1931). Similarly, Justice
Sanford indicated that the state "may punish these who abuse this freedom."
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927). "It was never contemplated
that . . . the Constitution should be a license to slander. This is an abuse
of the right to free speech." McCormack, Personal Liberty, 185 Annals 154,
157 (1936).
59
Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 336 fn. 5 (1946), dissenting opinion of
Frankfurter, J.
60 "To censure the licentiousness is to maintain the liberty of the press." C. J.
McKean in the Trial of William Cobbett, Wharton's State Trials (1949) 324;
"Freedom of speech is not license." City of Chicago v. Terminiello, 79 N.E. 2d
39, 45, Ill. (1948) ; "Liberty of the press must not be confounded with mere
license." Ex parte Shortridge, 99 Calif. 526, 535, (1893) ; "The liberty of the
press is one thing and licentious scandal is another." State v. Morrill, 16 Ark.
384, 403 (1855) ; "There is a marked and clear distinction to be taken between
the liberty of the press and the license of the press." Fitzpatrick v. Publishin Co., 48 La. Ann. 1116, 1130 (1896) ; "It is the liberty of the press that is
guaranteed-not the licentionsness." State ex inf. Crow v. Shepherd, 177 Mo.
205, 257, (1903); "All courts and commentators contrast the liberty of the
press with its licentiousness." People v. Most, 171 N.Y. 423, 432, 64 N.E. 175
(1902) ; "Where vituperation or licentiousness begins, the liberty of the press
ends." United States v. Harman, 45 F. 414, 415 (D.C. Kans., 1891).

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34

phrase is all to reminiscent of the boast of the "American Jeffreys,"
Samuel Chase, who asserted he would teach the lawyers of Virginia
the difference between the liberty and the licentiousness of the pressthe latter signifying to him criticism of the Administration contrary to
the diabolical Sedition Act of 1798.61 James Madison exposed so readily "the sophistry of a distinction between the liberty and the licentiousness of the press" that his words are worth quoting further. "So insatiable is a love of power," he wrote, "that it has resorted to a distinction between the freedom and licentiousness of the press for the
purpose of converting.., the Constitution, which was dictated by the
most lively anxiety to preserve that freedom, into an instrument for
abridging it ... the distinction between liberty and licentiousness is still
a repetition of the Protean doctrine of implication, which is ever ready
to work its ends by varying its shape. By its help, the judge as to
what is licentious may escape through any constitutional restriction.
Under it men of a particular religious opinion might be excluded from
office, because such exclusion would not amount to an establishment
of religion, and because it might be said that their opinions are licentious. And under it Congress might denominate a religion to be heretical
and licentious, and proceed to its suppression.1 62 Obviously there is
no guidance in the "abuse" or "licentious" standards, 63 and the words
too frequently have served only as apologetics for a judge who found
the particular expression distasteful.
William Rawle, the first of the noteworthy commentators on the
Constitution, wrote in 1825: "A previous superintendency of the press,
an arbitrary power to direct or prohibit its publications are withheld,
but the punishment of dangerous or offensive publications, which on
a fair and impartial trial are found to have a pernicious tendency, is
necessary for the peace and order of government and religion, which
are the solid foundations of civil liberty. ' 64 The origin of the notion
that freedom does not protect "dangerous or offensive publications" is
probably attributable to Blackstone who wrote: "If he publishes what
is improper, mischievous or illegal he must take the consequences of
his own temerity."6 5 Even Cooley rose not too far above these labels
for he, too, held that "harmful" utterences were not within the Constitutional guaranties. 66 Fortunately adjudication by appellation has
not been too common, although an occasional court asserts that Con6-

Beveridge, Life of John Marshall, III, 37.

62 Letter of Jan. 23,
63 " . .the familiar

1799, Writings (Hunt ed.) VI, 335-6.

formula that 'liberty does not mean license' is of little help

in solving concrete situations." Note, The Present Status of Freedom of
Speech under the Federal Constitution, 41 Harv.L.Rev. 525 (1927).
64 Rawle on the Constitution (1825) 120.
654 BI.Comm. 152.
66 Constitutional Limitations (1st ed., 1868) 422.
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stitutional freedom "has never been held" to extend to "the privilege
of publishing and disseminating baneful and harmful matter,"'6 7 and
once the United States Supreme Court ruled outside constitutional protection acts "evil in their nature." 6 Patently, "harmful-evil" concepts
are no better than "abuse-licentiousness" notions. All may be in the
pattern of the Declaration of the Rights of Man. "Liberty is the power
of everyone to do whatever does not injure others," but assuredly they
possess all the deficiencies as rules of societal behaviour and judicial
criterion characteristic of that platitude.
According to Mr. Justice Holmes, his colleagues of 1925 subjectively limited freedom. Caustically he wrote to Pollock: "The prevailing
notion of free speech seems to be that you may say what you choose
'
if you don't shock me."69
Holmes' colleagues would have been completely at home with the 1942 Bench that was shocked into the Chaplinsky decision. 70
A most amazing subjective theory has been suggested by Mr. Justice
Jackson. In the Prince case he wrote of the Court: "Our basic difference seems to be as to the method of establishing limitations which
of necessity bound religious freedom." He then continued, "My own
view may be shortly put: I think the limits begin to operate whenever
activities begin to effect or collide with liberties of other or of the
public."' 71 In an intensely interrelated culture activities "begin to affect"
others early in their existence. Not only is this language incapable of
intelligent application, but since 1919 the record attests the antipathy
of our people to phrases that would so readily suppress freedom. It
is perplexing how the Justice can subscribe to the clear and present
danger test,72 and yet condone denial of freedom "whenever activities
begin to affect" others. Since Justices Frankfurter and Roberts joined
in his opinion they too, may believe in such a criterion, but there is
little likelihood that the "begin to affect" principle will ever secure
further judicial or popular acceptance.
Alexander Meiklejohn recently argued "that, under the Constitution, there are two different freedoms of speech, and, hence, two differend guarantees of freedom rather than one. 7 3 He would have us disSolomen v. City of Cleveland, 159 N.E. 121, 124 (Ct. of App. of Ohio, Cuyahoga County, 1926).
- Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
692 Howe, Holmes-Pollock Letters, 163.
7oChaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
71 Prince v. Massachupsetts, 321 U.S. 158, 177 (1944).
67

72 "It

is now a commonplace that censorship or suppression of expression of

opinion is tolerated by our Constitution only when the expression presents a
clear and present danger of action of a kind the State is empowered to prevent and punish." West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 633 (1943). Note also his recognition of "this long standing test" in his
dissenting opinion in Terminiello v. Chicago, 69 S.Ct. 894, 905 (1949).
73 Free Speech and its Relation to Self-Government (1948) 1.
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tinguish a non-abridgable First Amendment freedom of speech from a
Fifth Amendment "liberty of speech" abridgable by due process of
law. 74 The former comprises "discussions of public policy," while the
latter consists of "discussions of private policy." 75 Without endorsing
such a test one can recognize that expression of the affairs of government has been historically the particular protection of constitutional
safeguards. For instance, the Vermont Constitution of 1786 provided:
"That the people have a right of freedom of speech and of writing and
publishing their sentiments, concerning the transactionsof .government
...and therefore the freedom of the press ought not to be restrained." 76
Meiklejohn recognized that "the crucial task is that of separating public
and private claims"7 7 but he offers little help to a judiciary charged
with the task of delimiting freedom. "Such discussion would go far
beyond the limits of the present inquiry," he explains." The "public"
interest in anything is a totality of individual interests, and the distinction between "public" and "private" interests is a difficult, if not impossible, responsibility. Even a sympathetic author admits: "The distinction is not easy to make."7 9 Nor is there any more judicial utility
in his statement that the First Amendment "does not forbid the abridging of speech, but at the same time, it does forbid the abridging of
the freedom of speech."8' 0 Verbalistic vagaries such as this afford little
assistance to jurists conscientiously concerned with demarcating the
area of permissible freedom. Professor Chafee, a most sympathetic
critic and friend of Meiklejohn, has had to conclude: ". .

he does

not realize how unworkable his own views would prove when applied
in litigation." 8'
Occasionally it is suggested that civil liberties should be denied
those who would use them to thereafter deny freedom to others.8 2 This
obviously is at best only a partial test for it in no way aids in the demarcation of permissible expression by those who believe in civil liberty
for others. The formula has a certain superficial attraction in dealing
with groups having totalitarian inclinations, since they have so little
ethical claim to democratic sympathies. However, the Communists
and Fascists against which the formula is professedly aimed profusely
protest their devotion to freedom, and the difficulty of proving their
lack of attachment to freedom of expression is evident from the cases
7
75

Id. 38.
Id. 90.

76 Poore, Federal and State Constitutions (1878)

1869.
Free Speech and its Relation to Self-Government (1948)

99.
78 Ibid.
79 Note, Verbal Acts and Ideas-The Common Sense of Free Speech, 16 U. of
Chi.L.Rev. 328, 333 (1949).
8o Free Speech and it Relation to Self-Government (1949) 19.
81 Book Review, 62 Harv.L.Rev. 891, 898 (1949).
82 Ascoli, "Freedom of Speech," 9 American Scholar (Jan., 1940) 97; Eastman,
"Limits of Free Speech," 53 American Mercury (Oct., 1941) 444.
77
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concerned with the nature of the Communist Party.83 Furthermore, as
Riesman has pointed out,8' there are always a plethora of other groups
in our midst willing to deny liberties to others, and at a particular
moment the criterion could bar a majority of the populace. There are
many, one suspects, who become emotional extremists from pathological drives for attention and the catharsis may be as healthy socially
as individually.
Communication in a democracy may be as much the right of the
auditor as the speaker and this formula unwittingly perhaps, but unwisely, insulates from ideas the good as well as the bad. Even the
expressions of bad men must be judged on their individual merits. To
ban expressions and assemblage because of the totalitarian tendency
of the sponsor inevitably fails under the rule of the Delonge case.88
There is ample reason to trust the ability of our people to discard the
chaff of totalitarian nonsense in the free market of thought.
Freedom for the few is not the freedom envisaged by the framers
of the First Amendment. And we, too, can agree with Professor
Beckler that the best "reason for conceding freedom of speech to
Nazis and Communists is that freedom of speech can neither be suppressed by argument, nor maintained by suppressing argument."8 6
There is inadequate evidence that denying civil liberties to groups
willing to resort to force has ever stemmed violence. Blowing off steam
is far preferable to blowing up the government. The denial, then, of
freedom of expression to those whom we suspect would deny them
to us is both impractical and unintelligent.
Statements of test were probably not intended by Chief Justice
Hughes when he indicated that the Cox case that statutes would survive
unless they "unwarrantedly" abridge freedom, 7 or by Mr. Justice Reed
when he stated in Kovacs v. Cooper: "The question is whether or not
there is a real abridgment of the rights of free speech."88 Our experience with the commerce clause is ample testimony to the inadequacy
of "real" interference tests.
The most frequently utilized subjective test before 1919 was that
of "bad tendency," known also as the "natural tendency," the "remote
tendency," and the "indirect causation," test.8 9 The test goes back at
Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945).
"Civil Liberties in a Period of Transition," 3 Public Policy 33, 56-7
84 Riesman,
(1942).
83

s5 DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
86 Becker, "Freedom of Speech," 138 Nation 94, 96 (1934). Note also Schneider,
"Free Speech and Liberal Speeches," 9 American scholar (July, 1940). 378.
87 Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941).
8869 S.Ct. 448, 453 (1949).
89 There are extensive collections of cases in Chafee, Free Speech (1920),
appendix II; and in Carroll, Freedom of Speech and of the Press in War
Time, 17 Mich.L.Rev. 621 (1919).
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least to the Trial of William Cobbett in 1797 when Chief Justice
McKean of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court charged the grand jury:
"To punish dangerous or offensive writings, which, when published,
shall, on a fair and impartial trial, be adjudged of a pernicious tendency, is necessary for the preservation of peace and good order, of
government and religion, the only solid foundation of civil liberty."9 0
There is evidence, furthermore, that the notion had earlier advocates
both in England and here. Certainly the evils of the suggestion were
well perceived by Dr. Phillip Furneaux who wrote to Blackstone: "If
the magistrate be possessed of a power to restrain and punish any
principles relating to religion because of their tendency ...religious
liberty is entirely at an end . ..if the line be drawn between mere
religious principle and the tendency of it, on the other hand, and those
overt acts which affect the public peace and order, on the other; and
if the latter alone be assigned to the jurisdiction of the magistrate, as
being guardian of the peace of society in this world, and the former as
interfering only with. a future world, be referred to a man's own conscience; the boundaries between civil power and liberty, in religious
matters, are clearly marked and -determined; and the latter will not be
wider or narrower, or just nothing at all, according to the magistrate's
opinion of the good or bad tendency of principle.., the tendency of
principles, though it be unfavorable, is not prejudicial, till it issues in
some overt acts against the public peace and order; and when it does,
then the magistrate's authority to punish commences; that is, he may
punish the overt acts, but not the tendency, which is not actually hurtful... Punishing a man for the tendency of his principles, is punishing
him before he is guilty, for fear he should be guiltyY"'
Before the Constitution, Thomas Jefferson was well aware of the
dangers to freedom inherent in "tendency" tests. In the preamble to his
Act for Religious Freedom adopted in 1785, Mr. Jefferson said: "That
to suffer the civil magistrate to intrude his powers into the field of
opinion, and to restrain the profession or propagation of principles on
the supposition of their ill tendency, is a dangerous fallacy, which at
once destroys all religious liberty. .. , The Gitlow case 3 marks the
90 Wharton's State Trials (1849) 323-4.

915 BI.Comm., App. 34.
92 Preamble to 12 Hon. Stat. 84.
93 Gitlow v. People of State of New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). "The 'reasonable
tendency' test applied in Gitlow v. New York, although never evpressly overruled, was never applied thereafter. Its use in that case may have resulted
from the Court's doubts as to the extent of protection offered by the 'new
liberty' under the Fourteenth Amendment. At any rate, Bridges v. California,
seems to have settled the law in favor of the application of the 'clear and
present danger' test to state action challenged as violative of free speech."
Note, Unconstitutional Abridgment of Free Speech by Municipal Ordinance,
24 N.Y.U.L.Q.Rev. 885, 889 fn. 30 (1949).
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last open and avowed application of the tendency test by a United
States Supreme Court majority, and by that time it had been completely
abandoned by Justice Holmes and Brandeis. A jury inflamed with the
passions of the day could hardly ever fail to convict a speaker since
anything beyond a shallow salutation will "tend" sometime, in some
degree, to something unwelcome to the temporal majority.94 Statutes
prescribing words of evil "tendency" should well be held to violate
constitutional standards of certainty and clarity. And the opportunity
of a jury to speculate on the "bad tendency" of an expression makes
a sham of the Bill of Rights. Mr. Justice Roberts ably observed in the
Herndon case that for a jury to apply a tendency test "involves pure
speculation as to future trends of thought and action ...

The law, as

thus construed, licenses the jury to create its own standard in each
case." 95 Capable jurists for a long time have recognized that tendency
tests provided not only opportunity but incentive for the denial of freedom of expression and it was openly repudiated as early as 1917 by
judge Learned Hand.
In Masses Publishing Company v. Patten,Judge Hand wrote:
"If one stops short of urging upon others that it is their duty
or their interest to resist the law, it seems to me one should not
be held to have attempted to cause its violation. If that be not
the test, I can see no escape from the conclusion that under this
section every political agitation which can be shown to create a
seditious temper is illegal.""
It was only when "language directly advocated resistance to the draft"
that it could be punished. 97 Of Judge Hand's test one writer reflected:
"This test would not afford a government much protection, because
a person could arouse and excite people against the government without
being stopped as long as he did not conclude his statement with a direct
appeal for the people to do some unlawful act."981 This conclusion is
quite unsound-only a naive alarmist would fail to appreciate that a
jury in wartime can find rather readily a direct incitement to draft
evasion. Judge Hand's principle was not adopted by contemporary
courts and, in fact, his Masses decision was overruled by a "bad ten94 "This bad tendency test is an English eighteenth century doctrine wholly at

variance with any true freedom of discussion, because it permits the government to go outside its proper field of acts, present or probable, into the field
of ideas, and to condemn them by the judgment of a judge or jury, who,
human nature being what it is, consider a doctrine they dislike as so liable to
cause harm sbme day that it had better be nipped in the bud." Chafee, The
Inquiring Mind (1928) 104.
95 Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 263 (1937)
96 Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 Fed. 535, 540 (D.C.E.D.N.Y., 1917).
97 Id. 542.
• Walsh, Is the New Judicial and Legislative Interpretation of Freedom of
Speech and of Freedom of Press Sound Constitutional Development? 21 Geo.
L.J. 161, 167 (1933).
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dency" Court of Appeals which was willing to make language criminal
"if the natural and reasonable effect of what is said is to encourage
'
resistence to the law."99
Although the decision was overruled and his
test unhonored, Judge Learned Hand must be recognized as the first to
judicially deny the tendency tests and insist upon a closer, more intimate causal relationship between the expression and the evil before
speech could be punished. In this he ideologically anticipated the clear
and present danger criterion.
Generally legislation allegedly violative of due process will be sustained by the United States Supreme Court if "reasonable,"' 00 and
there is ordinarily a presumption that the legislation is valid.' 0' The
early Gitlow1 0 2 and Whitney1' 3 cases recognized such a presumption
as applicable even to legislation restrictive of the First Amendment
freedoms. However, in 1937, there was a strong intimation from the
Court that such a presumption was passe when abridgments of freedom
were involved. That year the Court in Herndon v. Lowry announced
that "The power of a state to abridge freedom of speech and of assembly is the exception rather than the rule ...The judgment of the legislature is not unfettered." 0 4 The following year Mr. Justice Stone
noted in the Carolene case: "There may be a narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears
on its face to be within the specific prohibition of the Constitution, such
as those of the first ten Amendments, which are deemed equally specific
when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth."' 10 5 By 1939 only Mr.
Justice McReynolds dissented from the same view, as expressed by Mr.
Justice Roberts for the Court in Schneider v. New Jersey. "In every
case, therefore, where legislative abridgment of the rights is asserted,"
said Justice Roberts, "the courts should be astute to examine the effect
of the challenged legislation. Mere legislative preferences or beliefs
respecting matters of public convenience may well support regulation
directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such
as diminishes the rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions. And so, as cases arise, the delicate and difficult task falls upon
the courts to weigh the circumstances and to appraise the substantiality
of the reasons advanced in support of the regulation of the free enjoyment ofP the rights."'1° 6 Then in 1945, Mr. Justice Rutledge speaking
for the Court in Thomas v. Collins assured us that "the usual pre99246 Fed. 24 (C.A. 2d, 1917).
'00 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
10 Notes, 31 Col.L.Rev. 1136 (1931). 36 Col.L.Rev. 283 (1936).
102 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
103 Whitney v. California. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
104301 U.S. 242, 258 (1937).
105 United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 fn. 4 (1938).
106308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939).
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sumption supporting legislation is balanced by the preferred place given
in our scheme to the great, the indispensable democratic freedom
10 7
secured by the First Amendment."'
The majority of the Court will thus differentiate between other
legislation and statutes restrictive of the First Amendment freedoms,
and will subject the latter to "a searching judicial inquiry into the legislative judgment."' 08 The distinction will be based upon the specific
inclusion of the basic liberties in the Constitution. Mr. Justice Jackson
bespoke the attitude of the Court's majority when he said: "In weighing arguments of the parties it is important to distinguish between the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as an instrument
for transmitting the principles of the First Amendment and those cases
in which it is applied for its own sake. The test of legislation which
collides with the Fourteenth Amendment, because it also collides with
the principles of the First, is much more definite than the test when
only the Fourteenth is involved. Much of the vagueness of the due process clause disappears when the specific prohibitions of the First become
its standard. The right of a state to regulate, for example, a public
utility may well include, so far as the due process test is concerned,
power to impose all of the restrictions which a legislature may have a
'rational basis' for adopting. But freedoms of speech and of press,
of assembly, and of worship may not be infringed on such slender
grounds. They are susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave and
immediate danger to interests which the state may lawfully protect.
It is important to note that while it is the Fourteenth Amendment
which bears directly upon the state it is the more specific limiting
principles of the First Amendment that finally govern this case."' 1 9
Without the benefit of a presumption of constitutionality, "the burden
is on those imposing such restrictions to support the substantiality of
0
the reasons advanced.""1
207

323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).

"This persumption in favor of state legislation...

does not extend to legislation which is challenged as restricting civil liberties."
Barnett, Mr. Justice Black, 8 U. of Chi.L.Rev. 20, 27 (1940) ; "...the Court
abandoned the presumption of constitutionality in political activity cases..."
Lusky, Minority Rights and Public Interest, 52 Yale L.J. 1, 19 (1942); "The
present Court is firmly committed to the proposition that the First Amendment liberties have a preferred place in our constitutional law. It holds that
the normal presumption in favor of the constitutionality of legislation does
not exist for statutes which on their face invade one of these freedoms.. !'
Fellman, Recent Tendencies in Civil Liberties Decisions of the Supreme
Court, 34 Corn.L.Q. 331, 348 (1949). But cf. National Maritime Union v.
Herzog: "But in answering independently we must give weight, we think, to
the strong presumption of constitutional validity which accompanies the judgment of Congress. . ." 76 F.Supp. 146, 168 (DC, D. of C., 1948) affirmed 68
S.Ct. 1529 (1948).

Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 606 (1940), Stone, J.,
dissenting.
109 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
110 Barnett, Mr. Justice Murphy, Civil Liberties and the Holmes Tradition, 32
'08

Corn.L.Q. 177, 205 (1946).
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Although obviously the denial to legislation limitative of the fundamental freedoms of a presumption of constitutionality does not automatically raise a presumption of unconstitutionality, the latter should,
and may well, be recognized by the Court. As far back as 1928 Mr.
Justice Cardozo wrote: "If the reading of the balance is doubtful, the
'
presumption in favor of liberty should serve to tilt the beam."111
By
now Mr. Justice Frankfurter fears that the majority of his brethren
may recognize such a presumption, 112 and fortunately his fears may be
justified. Mr. Justice Murphy asserted that "the human freedoms
enumerated in the First Amendment and carried over into the Fourteenth are to be presumed to be invulnerable and any attempt to sweep
'
away those freedoms is prima facie invalid."113
Mr. Justice Rutledge
also affirmed that the legislative "judgment does not bear the same
weight and is not entitled to the same presumption of validity when
the legislation on its face or in specific application restricts the rights
of conscience, expression and assembly protected by the (First)
Amendment, as are given to other regulations having no such tendency.
The presumption rather is against the legislative intrusion into these
domains."'1
In this statement Justices Black, Douglas and Murphy
concurred. Hamilton and Braden conclude that "The current bench,
accentuating a trend which for a decade has been in the making, has
in effect set up a presumption of unconstitutionality against all legislation which on its face strikes at freedom of speech, press, assembly,
or religion,"'115 and other capable commentators have indicated that they
consider the presumption presently applicable." 6 Mr. Justice Frankfurter insists, however that "the claim that any legislation is presumptively unconstitutional which touches the field of the First Amendment
and the Fourteenth Amendment, insofar as the latter's concept of
'liberty' contains what is specifically protected by the First, has never
111 Paradoxes of Legal Science (1928) 115.

- Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949), concurring opinion.

Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 173 (1944), dissenting opinion. Note
also his concurring opinion in Bridges v. Wixon: "Such a statute. . . does
not pretend to require proof of a clear and present danger so as properly to
negative the presumption that iidividual rights are supreme under the Constitution." 326 U.S. 135, 165 (1945).
114United States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations, 335 U.S. 106, 140
(1948), concurring opinion.
115 The Special Competence of the Supreme Court, 50 Yale L.J. 1319, 1349 (1942).
116 "In cases in which legislative restrictions are placed upon freedom of speech,
press, religion, or assembly, this rule is now reversed. These restrictions will
be presumed to be invalid.. ." Cushman, Keep Our Press Free, Public Affairs
Pamphlet No. 123 (1946) 23. "The usual presumption in favor of constitutionality has been discarded, and there have even been indications that a
contrary presumption may be indulged." Note, 49 Col.L.Rev. 363, 369 (1949).
See also Note, 40 Col.L.Rev. 531 (1940); and Note, 1949 Wisc.L.Rev. 358,
365. Green, however, feels that the presumption of unconstitutionality "cannot yet be taken as established." The Supreme Court, the Bill of Rights and
the States, 97 U. of Pa.L.Rev. 608, 635 (1949).
"13
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commended itself to a majority of this Court." 117 Although the effect
to be accorded a presumption is neither settled nor uniform in American law, even the generally accepted minimal effect makes meaningful
the affixation of a presumption of unconstitutionality to ordinances
and statutes denying the First Amendment freedoms. This can be a
valuable step forward in the delimitation of the fundamental freedoms.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter would generally defer to the legislative
will just as reverently when the Court is passing upon statutes abridging Constitutional liberties as upon other legislation."" Presumably
his failure to dissent from the language of the Court in the Schneider
case was only a momentary lapse."29 One is entitled, however, to greater perplexity (and disappointment) at his position in the light of his
language in Marsh v. Alabama where he speaks of "the class of freedom which the Bill of Rights was designed to resolve-the freedom of
the community to regulate its life and the freedom of the individual
to exercise his religion and disseminate his ideas."' 20 This is remarkably similar to the language of Mr. Justice Jackson for the Court in
the Barnette case, from which in 1943 Mr. Justice Frankfurter felt
compelled to dissent. "The very purpose of a Bill of Rights," Mr.
Justice Jackson stated, "was to withdraw certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach
of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to
be applied by the courts."' '2 It seems obvious that the Bill of Rights is
an empty gesture devoid of any legal significance if legislative denials
of freedom are to be treated with the deference customarily accorded
other legislation. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's deference to the legislature's abridgments of freedom seems not much above personal predilection in the light of his enthusiastic negation of the legislative -will
when concerned with the companion establishment of religion clause
of the same Amendment. 22 Is the legislature somehow metamorphosed
into co-ordinate trustees of government when they begin abridgments
of freedom?
Those who would apply here a "reasonable" test and defer to the
legislative determination of the limits of liberty have failed to appreciate that the First Amendment limits legislative auhority with particularity unknown to the generality of due process that governs other
legislation and that to the observance of these Constitutional limits
-11 Kovacs v. Cooper, 36 U.S. 77, 94-5 (1949) concurring opinion.

118 See particularly his dissenting opinion in West Virginia State Board of Edu-

cation v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 646 (1943), and his concurring opinion in
Kovacs v..Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949).
129 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
10 326 U.S. 501, 511 (1946), concurring opinion. (Italics added).
11 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
" 2 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) ; McCollum v. Board of
Education, 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948).
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the judiciary was dedicated. A similar basic error is manifested in
the Gitlow theory 2 3 that would enable a legislature to determine constitutional limits upon its own competence by subtleties of draftsmanship. Even utilitarians who would overlook both natural rights philosophy and the Bill of Rights itself must'discern that in the delimitation of liberty there are two opposed societal interests. While the
judiciary has given ample evidence of its solicitude for the societal
interests opposed to the interest in expression, there is far less evidence that temporal majorities can perceive and protect the societal
interest in the search for truth. It is worth remembering Duguit's
query: if law is simply majority rule, is it worth the effort of study?
There is neither historical necessity nor utilitarian justification for
permitting legislative finality of determination in the abridgment of
freedom. There is not the least proof that even Jefferson would have
opposed judicial invalidation of of legislative denials of freedom. It
is naive to suppose, as some commentators seem to, that Mr. Jefferson
was blind to the tyranny of legislative majorities. Writing to Mr.
Madison in 1789 he noted the tyranny of legislatures as the most formidable dread of our form of government. 24 That Mr. Madison, the
sponsor of the First Amendment, intended a vigorous, searching judicial review is obvious from his words on the floor of the Congress.
"If they (basic rights) are incorporated into the Constitution," he
said, "independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a
peculiar manner the guardians of those rights, they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the Legislative
or Executive; they will be naturally led to resist every encroachment
upon rights expressly stipulated for in the Constitution by the Declara25
tion of rights.'
Utilitarians can perceive that when, by legislative mandate, one's
due process of law is purportedly violated by a requirement of safety
appliances for his employees, his "injury" can be rectified by recourse
to the legislature, but when a legislature stifles criticism and denies the
communication of ideas there is no opportunity for the democratic
correction of errors. 2 6 If democratic, representative government is to
succeed temporal majorities cannot be permitted to deny minorities
the possibility of becoming majorities, nor can they be permitted to
v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
- Letter of October 19, 1789, Tucker, I Life of Jefferson 282.
1251 Annals of United States Congress, 1st Cong., 440.
126 Mr. Justice Stone emphasized that the Court must treat differently laws that
"restrict those political p3rocesses which can ordinarily be expected to bring
about repeal of undesirable legislation." United States v. Carolene Products,
304 U.S. 144, 152 fn. 4 (1938).
123 Gitlow
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quarantine from the electorate and the market-place ideas they consider "unreasonable."'1 7
While judges are mortals they will-without test or with any subjective test-be influenced in delimiting freedom by their own values
and ideas of reasonableness. If they remain cognizant of the preferred
place in our American hierarchy of socio-legal values occupied by the
fundamental freedoms, and if they charge the abridgers of liberty with
the burden of proving the necessity thereof by clear and convincing evidence-through recognition of a presumption of unconstitutionality
or otherwise-the judiciary will meet its responsibility to a constitutional society that has deliberately enshrined the basic freedoms. If
in the hands of judges the "reasonable" test means anything less than
this, it gives no legal significance to the First Amendment; it recognizes inadequately what the Founding Fathers and many others have
considered as natural rights,2 8 and by unnecessarily isolating the people
from ideas it jeoparadizes the future of our democracy.
Attempted distinctions between acts and speech or opinions.
Thomas Jefferson insisted that beliefs and even speech must go
unfettered until activity dangerous to the state results. In his 1779
draft of "A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom" in Virginia,
he asserted "that it is time enough for the rightful purposes of civil
government for its officers to interfere when principles break out
into overt acts against peace and good order.'1 29 In 1801 another
American scholar wrote: "Political opinions never can be destructive
of social order, or public tranquility, if allowed a free operation. The
127 In

1826 Chancellor Kent wrote: "The liberal communication of sentiment,
and entire freedom of discussion, in respect to the character and conduct of
public men, and of candidates for public favour, is deemed essential to the
exercise of the right of suffrage, and of that control over their rulers, which
resides in the free people of these United States." Commentaries (1st ed.,
1826) II, 14. And in 1931 Chief Justice Hughes stated: "The maintenance of
the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may
be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by
lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a
fundamental principle of our constitutional system." Stromberg v. California,
283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).
128 That the present Court is not motivated solely by utilitarian drives, witness
their expansion of procedural due process at the time when they are severely
contracting substantive due process.
129 12 Hening's Statutes at Large of Virginia (1823), c. 34, p. 84. Jefferson said
on other occasions: ". . .the legislative powers of the government reach actions only, and not opinions," and "We have nothing to fear from the demoralizing reasonings of some, if others are left free to demonstrate their
errors and especially when the law stands ready to punish the first criminal
act produced by the false reasonings; these are safer corrections that the
conscience of a judge." See his address to Danbury Baptist Association, cited
in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878). Whipple points out
that "This idea that the limit on freedom of speech or press should be set
only by an actual overt act was not new. It had been asserted by a long line
of distinguished thinkers, including John Locke, Montesquieu, the Reverend
Phillip Furneaux, James Madison.. ." Our Ancient Liberties (1927) 95.
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law is a all times sufficiently energetic to punish disturbers of the
public peace. When men are found guilty of this, let them be punished,
it is well. It is not then punishing opinion, it is punishing actions injurious to the peach of the community. 130 Jefferson's words have been
quoted, with apparent approval, by the United States Supreme Court,' 3'
and capable scholars throughout our national history have insisted
that only actions could be punished; that opinions and speech were
immune. 13 That speech was not constitutionally punishable unless it
was proved to have resulted in criminal activity was argued to the
courts by defense counsel in World War I sedition trials, but in vain.33
"The libertarian proposes that all psychological tests of words be
abandoned and the actual and material injury become the test of the
overt act, rather than mere opinion as to the problematical effect of
words upon a hypothetical person." 134 And the enthusiasm of libertarians for this standard can be appreciated since subjective tests permit judicial guessing at what might happen from the expression, and
only rarely does non-vocal activity result from "dangerous" words.
Insistence upon an overt net endangering another societal interest
is generally sound. However, it must be realized that the mere utterance of words occasionally carries an impact of injury. The slanderous,
the insulting, the profane, and the obscene are immediately injurious.
As Riesman observes, the "fallacious distinction between verbal and
nonverbal behavior.., gives the former an unjustifiable immunity from
supervision."

13 5

Furthermore, the state's justifiable interest in self-

preservation permits some anticipatory restraints upon freedom. Even
Mill recognized "the right inherent in society to ward off crimes against
itself by antecedent precautions . . .136 Organized society will never
permit a test of freedom that will tie its hands until it is overthrown.
An Illinois court expresses the fear characteristically: "If the state
were compelled to wait until the apprehended danger became certain,
then its right to protect itself would come into being simultaneously
Thomson, Concerning the Liberty & Licentiousness of the Press (1801) 79.
Italics in original.
In Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 163 (1875) Note also the interesting
application of the test by Judge Schwellenbach in United States v. Hillyard,
52 F.Supp. 612 (D.C., E.D.Wash.1943), where he found defendant's "refusal
to serve (on a jury) does not amount to a breaking out 'into overt acts
against peace and good order"' and dismissed an action for failure to report
for jury service.
132 Schroeder, Obscene Literature and Constitutional Law (1911); Bates, This
Land of Liberty (1930); Rosenwein, The Supreme Court and Freedom of
Speech, 9 Law. Giuld Rev. 70, 73 (1949).
133Wechsler, Symponium on Civil Liberties, 9 Am.L. School Rev. 881, 882
(1941).
134 Whipple, Our Ancient Liberties (1927) 96.
135 Civil Liberties in a Period of Transition, 3 Public Policy 33, 53 (1942).
136 Essay on Liberty (1859), ed. McCallum (1946) 67.
130

JUDICIAL DELIMITATION OF FREEDOMS

with the overthrowe of the government." '37 Carr is right in stating
that even if a bill of rights "is embodied in a constitutional or legal
enactment, it will always carry with it its 'escape clause," writen or
unwritten. The government of the day, always, in effect, has the
reserve power of withdrawing any right which is exercised in a man138
ner which threatens the overthrow of the existing order."
Contemporary advocates of the Jeffersonian immunization of
speech, with the corrolary of responsibility for action, seemingly fail
to perceive the illiberal consequences of such a dichotomy. Today considerable activity, such as picketing or distributing literature, is afforded
the protection of the First Amendment. That the Constitution safeguards more than cloistered contemplation is clear from the words of
Mr. justice in Thomas v. Collins. Speaking of the authors of the Bill
of Rights, he wrote: "The protection they sought was not solely for
persons in intellectual pursuits. It extends to more than abstract discussion, unrelated to action. The First Amendment is a charter for
government, not for an institution of learning. 'Free trade in ideas'
means free trade in the opportunity to persuade to action, not merely
to describe facts. Indeed, the whole history of the problem shows
it is to the end of preventing action that repression is primarily directed
1 39
and to preserving the right to urge it that the protections are given. 2
Through speech actually produces annoyance in the auditor or unrest
in the attendant mob, it cannot for that alone be constitutionally limited. 140 Since we have societally matured to the point that not all undesirable speech-activity or resultant action can be punished under the
First Amendment, it would be retrogression to adopt an "action :punishment" standard. Essentially, advocates of such a theory miss the
core of the problem which is to determine what social interests are so
precious that activity endangering them cannot be permitted; and,
how far in advance of imperiling activity can the majority impose
restrictions upon expression? The "action" test is of no help whatsoever in answering the former, and fatally deceptive in understanding
the latter.
It is in the absence of both injury-inflicting-speech and the dangerous overt act that we must inquire critically into the propriety of
criminal sanctions upon expression. And much more need we challenge
the constitutionality of convictions when there is no speech. Particularly is it necessary today to examine the validity of convictions for
conspiracy to speak, publish or advocate certain ideas. Here the state
137

People v. Lloyd, 136 N.E. 505, 512, 304 Ill.
23 (1922).

138United Nations World, vol. III, No. 7 (July, 1949), p.55.
139 323 U.S. 516, 537 (1945).
140 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, (1940) ; Terminiello v. City of Chicago,

337 U.S. 1 (1949).
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is criminally sanctioning mental processes, not activity endangering
the state. It is not an act of violence that is proscribed; not an attempt
nor an incitement; not even an utterance. It is simply an agreementusually inferred from circumstances-to speak or publish or advocate
unwelcome ideas that is being penalized, something thrice removed
from any activity imperiling our political institutions. The federal
seditious conspiracy statute requires by its terms no overt act imperiling
the state, either by clear and present danger or even remotely."14 The
courts have required none.'
The Selective Training and Service Act
of 1940 did not by its langauge require an overt act to support a conspiracy conviction thereunder, 1 4 and the courts did not insist upon
one.14 4 Almost meaningless as applied to conspiracies to speak, publish or advocate is the requirement in the general federal conspiracy
statute 4 5 of "any act to effect the object of the conspiracy," or the
identical requirement in the conspiracy section of the Espionage Act
of 1917.146 It is not necessary that the overt act charged should be
the accomplishment of the conspiracy. 147 It is not even required that
the overt act be a criminal act.1 48 Furthermore, "acts and statements
made by one of the co-conspirators may be considered against all."' 149
There is a single case under the conspiracy section of the Espionage
Act of 1917 holding that the overt act must at least tend to effect violation of the substantive provisions of he Act ;150 generally, there is not
even this causal demand.'
The general conspiracy statute is of con141

"If two or more persons ... conspire to overthrow, put down ,or to destroy
by force the Government of the United States . . . they shall be fined not
more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than six years, or both." Title 18,

U.S.C., sec. 2384.

142 Bryant v. United States, 257 F. 378 (CA, 5th, 1919), cert. denied 40 S.Ct. 117

(1919) ; Enfield v. United States (CA, 8th, 1919), 261 F. 141; Orear v. United

States, 261 F. 257 (CA, 5th, 1919) ; Reeder v. United States, 262 F. 36 (CA,
8th, 1919), cert. denied 252 U.S. 581 (1920) ; Anderson v. United States, 273
F. 20 (CA, 8th, 1921), cert. denied., 257 U.S. 647 (1921).
'14350 U.S.C.A., App., sec. 301 et seq..
'" United States v. O'Connell, 126 F.2d 807 (CA, 2d, 1942); United States v.
Singer et al., 49 F. Supp. 912 (D.C., W.D.Pa. 1943), affd. per curiam, 141
F.2d 262 (CA, 2d, 1944).
145 18 U.S.C.,

sec. 371.
146 18 U.S.C., sec. 2388.
147 Goldman v. United States, 245 U.S. 474 (1918) ; Phipps v. United States, 251

F. 879 (CA, 4th, 1918).
148 Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239 (1920).
149Albizu v. United States, 88 F.2d 138, 144 (CA, Ist, 1937), cert. denied, 301
U.S. 707 (1937).
150 United States v. Ault. 263 F. 800 (D.C.Wash., 1920).

151 "An examination of the federal cases will disclose that, generally speaking,

very little is required to constitute an overt act. The courts somehow discover an overt act in the conspirators." Pelleck, The Common-Law Conspiracy, 35 Geo.L.J. 328, 338 (1947). Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239
(1929) ; Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919) : O'Connell v. United
States, 253 U.S. 142 (1920); Sykes v. United States, 264 F. 945 (CA, 9th,
1920), cert. denied, 254 U.S. 655 (1921) ; Reeder v. United States, 262 F. 36

(CA, 8th, 1919), cert. denied 252 U.S. 581 (1920) ; United States v. Prieth,
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siderable importance today since upon the revision of the criminal code
the conspiracy section of the so-called Smith Act of 194052 was deleted,
and henceforth most of the prosecutions for conspiracy to advocate or
assemble will be brought under the general conspiracy statute. Prior
to the revision the conspiracy section of the Smith Act required no
overt act, and the prosecution was not held to proof of any by the
courts.15 3 Prosecutions under the general act for conspiracies to advocate and assemble will then pose in all its acuteness the problem:
can the state criminally punish, consistent with the First Amendment,
one who commits no dangerous overt act, who utters or advocates no
radical idea. It is suggested that it can not.
The perils of conspiracy prosecutions were noted well by the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges, presided over by Chief Justice Taft,
in 1925.154 In fact, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter points out, "long before
that judges who had observed these abuses had warned against
them."' 155 In 1940 Judge Learned Hand noted the "opportunities of
great oppression" in the "drag-net of conspiracy" doctrine,"5 " but the
most vigorous condemnation of "the growing habit to indict for conspiracy in lieu of prosecuting for the substantive offense itself" came
at the hands of Mr. Justice Jackson in 1949. Concurring in Krulewitch
v. United States, he wrote: "The modern crime of conspiracy is so
vague that it almost defies definition."' 57 And he noted: "The hazard
from loose application of rules of evidence is aggravated where the
Government institutes mass trials ... A co-defendant in a conspiracy
trial occupies an uneasy seat. There generally will be evidence of
wrongdoing by somebody. It is difficult for the individual to make his
own case stand on its own merits in the minds of jurors who are
ready to believe that birds of a feather are flocked together."'5 " "Guilt
by association," as Mr. Justice Murphy observed, "is a danger in any
conspiracy prosecution."' 15 With Justice Jackson Justices Murphy and
251 F. 946 (D.C.N.J.1918); United States v. Welln, 263 F. 833 (D.C.,W.D.
Wash.1917) ; Haywood v. United States, 268 F. 795 (CA, 7th, 1920).
18 U.S.C.A., sec. 11.
'153Dunne v. United States, 138 F2d 137 (CA, 8th, 1943), cert, denied, 320 U.S.
152

790 (1943), re-hearing denied, 320 U.S. 814 (1944).

Annual Report of the Attorney-General for 1925, pp. 5-6.
Nye and Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 626 (1949), dissenting opinion.
158 United States v. Falcone, 109 F.2d 579, 581 (CA, 2d, 1940).
11 336 U.S. 440, 446 (1949).
'1
'55

158 Id. at 453-4.
259

Nye and Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 630 (1949). The principle of
guilt by association is anathema to the American tradition. Charles Evans
Hughes stated in 1920: ". . .it is of the essence of the institutions of liberty
that it be recognized that guilt is personal and cannot be attributed to the
holding of opinion or to mere intent in the absence of overt acts." 5 N.Y.Legis.
Dec. No. 30, 143d Sess. 4. In 1946 Mr. Justice Rutledge, speaking for the
Court, said" "Guilt with us remains individual and personal, even as respects

conspiracies. It is not a mater of mass application." Note also the rejection
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Frankfurter joined in apprehension of "the grave dangers of abuse
to which conspiracy charges so readily lend themselves,"' 160 and Justice
Rutledge soon indicated his concern. 16 1 There are many other evidences
16 2
of fear that the dragnet of conspiracy is being abused.
The vagueness of the conspiracy charge1 63 is particularly reprehensible in proscriptions upon expression, an area in which the Court has
been most ready to strike down legislative controls because of vagueness and uncertainty.'6 The mass trial is found frequently in prosecutions for exercise of speech and assembly, 65 and the record well justifies Justice Jackson's apprehension. It took the Sherman Act to end
prosecutions of workers who dared "conspire" to elevate conditions
of toil. Similar legislative protection for others who associate in the
advance of unpopular ideas is not on the horizon. Admitedly there is
a greater societal peril at times from associated activity, and accordingly it is proper enough to sanction a concert of action. This, however,
must be the limit of the rule. And it cannot be constitutionally satisfied
by the sophistry of semantics that labels the agreement the act,'" and
by the International Tribunal in the Nuremberg Trial of the notion that an
individual could be convicted of conspiracy solely by proof of Nazi membership. Wechsler, The Issues of the Nuremberg Trial, 62 Pol.Sci.Q. 11, 21-2
(1947).
-0oConcurring, in Kruelwitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 458 (1949). Quotation from Frankfurter, J., in Nye and Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S.
613, 626 (1949).
161 Concurring in dissent of Frankfurter, J., Nye and Nissen v. United States,
336 U.S. 613, 627 (1949).
1,8 Chafee, Free Speech in the United States, (1941) 470-84; Harne, Intent in
Criminal Conspiracy, 89 U. of P.L.Rev. 624, 646 (1941); Note, Vicarious
Liability of Co-Conspirators, 56 Yale L.J. 371 (1946); Note, The Conspiracy
Dilemma; Prosecution of Group Crimes of Protection of Individual Defendants, 62 Harv.L.Rev. 276 (1948); Note, Guilt by Association-Three Words
in Research of a Meaning, 17 U. of Chi.L.Rev. 148 (1949). Note also remarks of Rep. Coffee of Washington, at House hearings on the Smith Bill,
84 Cong Rec. 9536 (1939).
123 ". .owing
to the elasticity of the crime and its vague boundaries, there can
be no doubt that it presents serious potential dangers of abuse." Harno, Intent in Criminal Conspiracy, 89 U. of Pa.L.Rev. 624, 646 (1941). "The modern
crime of conspiracy is so vague that it almost defies definition." Jackson, J.,
4 concurring in Kruelwitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 446 (1949).
"% Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937) ; Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S.
359 (1931); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); Saia v. New York,
334 U.S. 558 (1948).
165 United States v. Pelley, 132 F.2d 170 (CA, 7th, 1943) ; Dunne v. United States,
138 F.2d 137 (CA, 8th, 1943) ; as well as the recent "Foley Square Trial" of
eleven Communist Party leaders.
16s "By a metaphysical train of reasoning, which has never been adopted in any
other case in the whole criminal law, the offense of conspiracy is made to
consist in the intent, in an act of the mind; and to prevent the shock to
common sense, which such a proposition would be sure to produce, the formation of this intent by the interchange of thoughts, is made itself an overt
act, done in pursuance of the interchange of agreement." New York Commissioners charged with revising the conspiracy statutes, quoted in Pollack,
Common-Law Conspiracy, 35 Geo.L.J. 328, 337 (1947).
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finds the agreement in circumstances. 8 67 To constitutionally abridge
freedom of speech and assembly, conspiracy convictions must at the
very least require approval of, 188 and participation in, 8 9 activity constituting a clear and present danger 7 0 to the foundations of our sociopolitical order. Constitutional freedom of expression has significance
only to soliloquists if one can be punished for his beliefs because of the
innocent act of another, unauthorized and oft' unknown.
There are others who, having realized that some communications
contribute to the attainment of what are to them socially desirable
results while others are "harmful," would label the latter "verbal acts"
and place them beyond the pale of constitutional protection. In 1911
Mr. Justice Lamar said: "In the case of an unlawful conspiracy, the
agreement to act in concert when the signal is punished gives the words
'Unfair,' 'We Don't Patronize,' or similar expressions a force not
inhering in the words themselves, and therefore exceeding any possible
right of speech which a single individual might have. Under such circumstances they become what have been called 'verbal acts,' and as
much subject to injunction as the use of any other force whereby
property is damaged.' 7' This is limiting free speech when it supposedly injures another interest by its immediate impact; it is basically a
determination that the ideational content of the communication is so
small or so meager a help to the functioning of democracy or the attainment of man's goals that it does not deserve the free air of the marketplace. "The protection of the First Amendment may be invoked only
when the words are intended to convey leads," states one "verbal act"
enthusiast. 72
Attempts to measure constitutional protection by the ideational content of the uterances are as inherenly clumsy and unsuccessful as they
are undesirable. If judges could be provided with standardized tools
187 Proof of a formal agreement is unnecessary. It is held to be sufficient if
the circumstances, acts and conduct of the parties indicate an agreement.
Classer v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
8 "This intent, when given effect by overt acts, is the gist of conspiracy. While
it is not identical with mere knowledge that another purposes unlawful action,
it is not unrelated to such knowledge. Without the knowledge, the intent

cannot exist. Furthermore, to establish the intent, the evidence of knowledge must be clear, not equivocal." Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319
U.S. 703, 711 (1943).

1869Knowledge or even approval is not enough to prove conspiracy. There must

be some affirmative conduct by the defendant. Thomas v. United States, 57

170

F2d 1039 (CA, 10th, 1932).
"It would seem appropriate, therefore, to apply the clear-and-present-danger
test to legislative restraints on organizing and joining." Note, Guilt by Association-Three Words in Search of a Meaning, 17 U. of Chi.L.Rev. 148, 162

fn. 75.
"7 Gompers v. Buck's Stove & R. Co., 221 U.S. 418, 439 (1911).
172 Note, Verbal Acts and Ideas-The Common Sense of Free Speech, 16 U. of
Chi.L.Rev. 328 (1949). The common nonsense of inquiring into every speaker's

intent is more than an extravagant dissipation of juridical energy.
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for detecting and measuring the worth of ideas, a society dedicated to
the belief of freedom would never institutionalize such power in the
mortals who adorn the bench. The United States Supreme Court has
denied both the valadity of an idea-content test and its own omniscient
ability to judge the worth of ideas and beliefs. In Winters v. New
York, Mr. Justice Reed said for the Court: "We do not accede to
appellee's suggestion that the constitutional protection for a free press
applies only to the exposition of ideas. The line between the informing
and the entertaining is too elusive for the protection of that basic right.
Everyone is familiar with instances of propaganda through fiction.
What is one man's amusement, teaches another's doctrine. Though we
can see nothing of any possible value to society in these magazines,
they are as much entitled to the protection of free speech as the best of
literature."' 73 And, in United States v. Ballard, Mr. Justice Douglas
said for the Court: ". . . we do not agree that the truth or verity of
respondents' religious doctrines or beliefs should have been submitted
to the jury ...the First Amendment precludes such a course ... Men
may believe what they cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof
of their religious doctrines or beliefs."'1 74 As Miller has cogently stated:
"We cannot afford to give to anyone the power to determine which
kinds of comments ... are worthless and which are not."'175 Similarly
Professor Freund reflects: "The state may not punish open talk, however hateful... because a bit of sense may be salvaged from the odious
by minds striving to be rational, and this precious bit will enter into
the amalgam which we forge. At least that is our faith, and if we are
reminded that the irrational element furnishes the more powerful
charge in the process of transmutation, we may answer that we dare
not concentrate the whole enterprise in a few censors whose pathology
17
may be even more fatal."' 6
The "verbal act" test is miserably deficient in another aspect. Can
it be said that there is no ideational content in a call for the replacement of one form of government by another theory of the State?
Surely, too, there are ideas implicit in libels, slanders, fighting words,
obscenities and, in fact, in most utterances society places beyond the
pale. Furthermore, advocates of "verbal act" and "overt act" theories
can hardly deny the propriety of constitutional safeguards to many
communications of a non-vocal nature. The placard-carrying picket,
the distributer of religious leaflets, the schoolgirl refusing the flag
173

333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948).

174 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944). Note also the pungent statement of Justice Jackson:

"I would dismiss the indictment and have done with this business of judicially
examining other people's faiths." At 95, dissenting.
175 Principles of Law Limiting Radio Broadcasting, 9 F.R.D. 217, 229 (1949).
176 On Understanding the Supreme Court (1949) 26.
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salute are all as symbolic and communicative as any spoken idea, and
as much entitled to First Amendment protection. Meiklejohn aptly
inquires of the "verbal act" test: "Does it mean that whenever speech
is an act it has, therefore, no claim to the freedom guaranteed by the
First Amendment? That suggestion is clearly absurd. The distinction
between speech-actions and speech-thoughts is not, then, the distinction
which we need for the proper interpretation of the First Amendment.' 1 7 7 And Borgese is critically correct when he asserts: "The dis-

tinction between free speech and 'overt act' is utterly empirical. It
shifts according to circumstances and moods. It is practically deleted
in cases of real or alleged 'emergency.'"17
Our experience readily attests that the labels of "overt act" and
"verbal act," like their rivals, "abuse" and "licentiousness," would be
attached to expressions judges and juries found personally unpleasant.
A conscious weighing of societal interests far more intelligent and intelligible than the cryptosociological labelling of a mechanical jurisprudence is required to successfully delimit Constitutional freedoms.
The conscious, intelligent evaluation and reconciliation of opposed
societal interests necessary to successfully delimit freedom of expression has been accomplished most satisfactorily under the clear and
present danger criterion. Originating in 1919 it has since been applied
to the resolution of controversies involving freedom of speech, press,
religion and assembly, in criminal prosecutions and in civil causes, in
federal and state courts." 9 There is reason to believe that it can be
successfully employed in further freedom controversies. 80
The test has been criticized as "subjective"'' s and "uncertain", 8 2
but these are superficial charges. Any broad statement of constitutional
principal is necessarily uncertain until areas of constitutional behaviour
have been blocked out by case decision. The inadequacies of objective
determinants of freedom have already been pointed out. Of course,
the clear and present danger test is subjective in the sense that it is
flexible, and a test must permit of varying limits in times of peace
177Free Speech and its Relation to Self-Government (1948)

42-3.
17sThe Keyword Democracy, 3 Common Cause 179 (1949).
379 See Antieau, The Clear and Present Danger Formula; Its Origin and Application, in the May, 1950 University of Detroit Law Journal.
180 See Antieau, The Rule of Clear and Present Danger; Scope of its Applicability, in the April, 1950 Michigan Law Review.
181 Bates, This Land of Liberty (1930) 159; Whipple, Our Ancient Liberties
(1927) 96; Sherman, "Freedom of Speech and the Need Tor Public Order,"
26 Dicta 217, 219 (1949) ; Green, "The Supreme Court, the Bill of Rights and
the States," 97 U. of Pa.L.Rev. 608, 636 (1949).
182 Note, 24 Notre Dame Law, 236, 239 (1949) ; Danskin v. San Diego Unified
School District, (Calif., 1946) 171 P2d 885, 889, dissenting opinion of Justice
Spence; Teller, "Picketing and Free Speech," 56 Harv,L.Rev. 180, 196 fn. 74
(1942) ; Walsh, "It the New Judicial and Legislative Interpretation of Freedom of Speech, and of the Freedom of the Press, Sound Constitutional Development,?" 21 Geo.L.J. 161, 182 (1933).
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and war and permit expanding expression with social maturation and
security. In the sense that a subjective test permits the personal projection of judicial values the clear and present danger criterion is less
open to criticism than most of the competitive criteria. It must be
noted that it demands an evaluation of the "substantiality" of the evil,
which is merely another way of requiring an evaluation of the opposed
societal interest allegedly being imperiled by expression, but nowhere
does it demand, or even permit, a judge to inquire whether he thinks
the communication is one of substance or value. It implicitly recognizes
a constant social value from expression, and it is this the courts are to
weigh against the opposed interest. Noteworthy is it that the worst
Supreme Court decisions in this area have come when the Court
avoided application of the clear and present danger criterion and imposed their own standards of wisdom and worth upon the communication.

2 3

Since judges are mortals neither the clear and present danger criterion nor any other will immunize from restraint or punishment expressions considered "dangerous" by the temporal majority. But the
judiciary has the constitutional responsibility of according legal significance to the deliberate enshrinement of the fundamental freedoms in
the First Amendment. This requires the courage to independently and
critically consider the necessity for the particular restraint upon freedom of religion or freedom of expression. It demands, also, a continual awareness of the preferred place of the First Amendment freedoms in our socio-legal hierarchy of values. A test then should stimulate, if verbalization of principle ever can, a conscious evaluation of
the opposed social interests with a constant realization of the import
of the fundamental freedoms to free men and a critical inquiry into
the imperativeness of the restraint. More than any other of the competitive criteria, the record indicates that the clear and present danger
formula can satisfy these requirements.
Our background, as well as that of other countries, such as Australia and the Phillippines, having systems of judicial review comparable to our own, affords no proof as yet that any one standard need
be, or can be, utilized in the resolution of all freedom controversies.
-Historically, the courts have rather satisfactorily weighed opposing
!social interests in the clashes between the interest in expression and
the interest in preserving the public health without use of any verbalized formula, and there is no particular reason to insist upon adherence
to test here. Furthermore, courts have adequately protected the First
Amendment freedoms by invalidating restrictions as prior restraints,'"
's8 e.g. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
28 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S, 697 (1931).
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as unconstitutionally vague and indefinite proscriptionsm 5 and as taxes

upon the exercise of national rights.lsB These approaches should be
continued, rather than endeavoring to apply the clear and present danger test, or any other, to these controversies. There are further areas,
such as the extent of employer free speech or permissible punishments
for slanderous and obscene publications, in which the test has no record
of application, and into which forced transplantation of verbalized
standard would be of doubtful value.
Conclusion
When the Founding Fathers deliberately enshrined in our Constitution a mandate that "no law" was to abridge the fundamental freedoms they intended at the very least that legal significance be accorded
this hard-won accomplishment. To suggest that the framers of the First
Amendment did not anticipate the problems of our times is to rather
naively overlook the greater crises of their lifetimes. There are, admittedly, other societal interests that must be safeguarded, and there
are times when exercises of freedom reduce the freedom of others.
Playing a victrola outside a church will effectively reduce the totality
of freedom of religion. Limitation of liberty there must be, but our
constitutional system demands a critical judicial inquiry into the clear
necessity of the abridgment by courts that can keep in mind our
dedication to the dignity of the individual and the democratic processes
of rationality. If a statement of standard or principle can hold the
judiciary to its constitutional responsibility it deserves perpetuation.
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